The mathematics being developed to make artificial intelligence safe is best understood as work on three distinct properties, operating at three distinct scales. That is the organizing insight of a September 2026 paper by Cornell mathematician Lionel Levine, who argues that AI safety needs new mathematics targeting systems that are legible, steerable, and cooperative. Legibility concerns what is happening inside a model; steerability concerns what it does; cooperativeness concerns how it interacts with humans and other AIs. This three-scale map gives readers a way to sort the field's technical vocabulary—interpretability, robustness, formal verification, game theory—into goals that are genuinely different, rather than treating "AI safety math" as one undifferentiated research program.
The need for that clarity is real. In Levine's framing, artificial intelligence "threatens to outrun human understanding and control." Current training methods produce systems whose internal reasoning humans, including the engineers who designed them, often cannot follow except by reading the text a model emits while reasoning to itself. Formal verification promises a way around this—mathematical proof rather than intuition—but, as researchers in that area acknowledge, it faces hard practical limits. This article explains the three-property framework, locates the major mathematical approaches within it, and examines where formal verification fits and where it currently falls short.
Introduction to Mathematical AI Safety
Why does AI safety need mathematics at all? Because the alternative is empirical trial and error. If a system's behavior cannot be understood, predicted, or bounded except by observing it, then safety claims are always contingent on the tests that happened to be run. Levine's paper, styled as "an invitation for mathematicians," makes the case that designing AI that humans can understand, control, and cooperate with is a mathematical problem—or rather, a set of problems spread across mathematical fields.
Levine organizes that invitation by field, which is itself revealing about how the field divides. His mapping connects logic and game theory to cooperation; probability to agency and world-models; algebra and representation theory to learned features; and analysis and geometry to generalization and training dynamics. Each section of his paper ends with an open problem accessible to a working mathematician with no prior AI safety experience. In other words, the safety goals are not yet matched to finished tools; they are matched to open research programs.
The point of a scale-based framing is that these goals are not interchangeable. A system could in principle be perfectly legible but badly steerable, or provably well-behaved in isolation but harmful in interaction. Keeping the scales distinct prevents a common conflation, where a success in one area—say, a proof of robustness—is presented as if it settled safety as a whole.





